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 SECTION 5 AND THE INNOVATION CURVE  
 Daniel A.  Crane 1 
 the ftc’s authority to use Section 5 of the FTC Act to reach anticompetitive 
conduct that would not be illegal under the Sherman or Clayton Acts has been much 
discussed in recent years, particularly in conjunction with the FTC’s enforcement action 
against Intel. As of this writing, a Section 5 action against Google seems imminent. 
 I have previously written on Section 5 issues as a general matter. 2 In this chapter, I 
propose to focus more particularly on the question of Section 5 enforcement in highly 
innovative industries. To that end, I fi rst recap my general arguments on the justifi cations 
for, and limitations of, the Section 5 power. Consistent with my prior work, I propose six 
general principles to govern the application of Section 5. In the second part, I turn to the 
application of Section 5 to the innovative sectors of the economy. I distinguish between 
sectors where innovation is persistent but relatively linear or constant and sectors where 
the innovation curve is steep—where the rate of innovation is rapidly increasing at the 
time of the contemplated enforcement action. I suggest that the FTC should receive the 
most prophylactic space under Section 5 as to industries where the rate of innovation is 
not accelerating. Conversely, the Commission should be tied to more traditional anti-
trust norms as to industries where the rate of innovation is increasing. 
 12 
 1  Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
 2  See  Daniel A. Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement , 135–41 (2011); 
Daniel A. Crane,  Th oughts on Section 5 of the FTC Act and the Case against Intel ,  Antitrust Chron. (Feb. 
2010). 
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 I. General Principles of Section 5 
 a . section 5 and norm creation
 When Congress designed the FTC in 1914, it did not intend for the Commission to be 
merely another law enforcement agency such as the Justice Department. It gave the FTC 
wide investigatory powers, a structure designed to optimize expertise, broad remedial 
powers, and an open-textured substantive mandate. Th e FTC was designed to be not 
merely a law enforcer but a law creator. Given this statutory design, it is remarkable that 
the FTC has largely become simply an ordinary antitrust litigant—a norm taker rather 
than a norm maker. Th e FTC has become subordinate not only to the same norms as the 
Justice Department (which makes some sense), but to the norms created in private anti-
trust litigation (which does not). 
 If the Commission does not enjoy suffi  cient prophylactic space to shape antitrust 
norms, there is not much of a reason to have a Commission. Consider the following pas-
sage from Cass Sunstein’s seminal work,  Aft er the Rights Revolution :
 Imagine . . . the multiple problems that would arise if private litigants were permit-
ted to bring suit against “unfair and deceptive” advertising in the event that the 
Federal Trade Commission refused to act. Courts would be required to defi ne in 
the fi rst instance the statutory terms “unfair” and “deceptive.” Th e process of regu-
latory implementation would be removed from the agency. Administrative exper-
tise and accountability, so important in giving content to open-ended statutory 
terms, would be unavailable. All of the factors that gave rise to the agency would be 
undermined by independent judicial decisions. 3 
 Sunstein’s hypothetical ruminations about the loss of the FTC norm-creation authority 
in its consumer protection function uncannily describes what has actually occurred on 
the antitrust side. Th e Commission has lost an independent norm-creation power, and 
with it, “all of the factors that gave rise to the agency.” 
 Of course, those who do not embrace the technocratic expert commission model may 
cheer the demise of an independent, norm-creative FTC and hope that its relegation to 
conventional law enforcement spells its continued marginalization and perhaps, in the foot-
steps of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Public Utilities Holding Company 
Act, its eventual elimination. Let me off er three brief thoughts to those in this camp. 
 First, the FTC has survived repeated calls for its elimination and is unlikely to disap-
pear anytime soon. Hence, the pragmatic question is how to optimize the Commission’s 
institutional performance in its present environment, not how to make it go away. 
 3  Cass Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State 222–23 
(1990). 
 
148    Part III: Antitrust
 Second, it should be remembered that institutional modifi cations involve trade-off s. 
Th e political pressures that give rise to the antitrust impulse will not vanish if the FTC 
is marginalized; they will merely reappear at diff erent junctures. Th e growth of private 
litigation meant an increase in the comparative infl uence of juries, generalist trial judges, 
private plaintiff s, and treble damages. Th e backlash to private litigation led to a con-
traction of antitrust norms across the board. Now, the “post-Chicago” backlash to the 
backlash is bringing pressure for antitrust vigor to reemerge somewhere. 4 Who will be 
the institutional winners in any antitrust reemergence? Broadly speaking, the choice is 
between reinvigorating private litigation and its institutional baggage and reinvigorating 
the public enforcement agencies. Whatever the liabilities of the expert agency model, it 
has substantial advantages over the institutional realities of private litigation. 
 Finally, there is the question of what to do about the fact that according the FTC 
some extra norm-creation space under Section 5 gives the FTC advantages over the 
Justice Department. Th is is problematic in at least two ways. First, most of the reasons 
that justify according the FTC a norm-creation role—its expertise, its broad investi-
gatory powers, its comparative advantages over private litigation—apply equally to 
the Antitrust Division. Second, given that the two agencies essentially divide markets 
in terms of enforcement responsibility, application of diff erent legal standards to the 
FTC and Antitrust Division would lead to diff erent industries facing arbitrarily diff er-
ent substantive rules. For example, computer hardware (usually under the FTC) would 
face more stringent antitrust rules than computer soft ware (usually under the Antitrust 
Division). As Bob Pitofsky has explained, a construction of Section 5 that would make 
the same behavior lawful at the Department of Justice and unlawful at the FTC may be 
politically “untenable.” 5 
 Th ere is no simple answer to this quandary. Ideally, the line should be drawn between 
public and private enforcement, not between Section 5 and the Sherman Act. In the long 
run, a legislative modifi cation making that distinction is desirable, if it cannot be achieved 
through force of judicial common law. In the shorter run, reinvigorating public enforce-
ment as a whole—and not just the FTC’s fi efdom—requires a greater degree of joint 
enforcement and cooperation between the two agencies than has existed in the past. 
 b. invoking an independent section 5
 Th e FTC Act gives the Commission a seemingly simple mandate: detect and prohibit 
“unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive [trade] practices.” 6 Under 
 4  On the backlash to the Chicago School, see  How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The 
Effect of Conservative Antitrust Analysis on U.S. Antitrust (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
 5  See Workshop on Section 5 of the FTC Act as a Competition Statute (October 17, 2008),, Remarks of Robert 
Pitofsky, Offi  cial Transcript, http://www.ft c.gov/bc/workshops/section5/transcript.pdf, at 64. 
 6  15 U.S.C. § 45. 
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current law, the Commission’s powers under Section 5 are at least coextensive with the 
substantive reach of the Sherman Act—in other words, anything that is illegal under the 
Sherman Act is also illegal under the FTC Act. 7 But the Supreme Court has also held 
that the FTC may go further than the Sherman Act and “stop in their incipiency acts 
and practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts.” 8 Th us, “the standard 
of unfairness under the FTC Act . . . encompass[es] not only practices that violate the 
Sherman Act and the other antitrust laws . . . but also practices that the Commission 
determines are against public policy for other reasons.” 9 
 All of this is promising given the need to move public norms away from private norms. 
But, until recently, the Commission frequently tied itself to the Sherman Act, claim-
ing that in enforcing Section 5 of the Sherman Act, it is merely enforcing Sherman Act 
norms. 10 And that, of course, means accepting all of the Sherman Act’s private litigation 
baggage. Th is is in part a reaction to the fact that the courts have frequently quashed the 
FTC’s eff orts to develop an independent Section 5, even while paying lip service to the 
independence principle. 11 As Bill Kovacic has remarked, it is diffi  cult to fi nd even 10 suc-
cessfully litigated Section 5 antitrust cases over the Commission’s nearly hundred-year 
history. 12
 Th e reason for this judicial reluctance to permit deviation from Sherman Act norms 
is largely institutional. Courts tend to be jealous of their jurisdiction. To cite a venerable 
precedent, courts are loath to abandon their prerogative “to say what the law is.” 13 In an 
early decision—subsequently overruled but never quite forgotten—the Supreme Court 
applied a  Marbury v. Madison thematic to the FTC: “Th e words ‘unfair competition’ are 
not defi ned by the statute and their exact meaning is in dispute. It is for the courts, not 
the commission, ultimately to determine as a matter of law what they include.” 14 Courts 
are wary of agency assertions that the agency should be accorded independent space to 
develop  legal norms. 
 Hence, although legal doctrine theoretically allows space for an independent Section 
5, and there are good policy reasons for some movement away from the constraints of the 
Sherman Act, great care needs to be taken in the formulation of a “separation strategy.” 
It simply will not do for the FTC to declare independence from the Sherman Act and 
 7  FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948). 
 8  FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 348 U.S. 316, 322 (1966). 
 9  FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986). 
 10  See ,  e.g., Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (observing that the Commission had 
expressly limited its theory of liability to conduct that would violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act). 
 11  See generally FTC Workshop, Opening Remarks of Chairman William Kovacic, Offi  cial Transcript at 4–20, 
 available at http://www.ft c.gov/bc/workshops/section5/transcript.pdf. 
 12  Id. at 10. 
 13  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”). 
 14  FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920). 
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then proceed to formulate its own antitrust policy, as the Commission appears to have 
done in its recent case against Intel. 15 A “just trust us, we’re the FTC,” strategy has little 
chance of success in the courts. Rather, the FTC needs to pursue a cautious and incre-
mental Section 5 independence strategy. Critical to this strategy is explaining in each case 
what it is about the particular context of that case that justifi es an independent Section 5. 
I propose six contexts in which judicial deference to Commission norm creation may be 
particularly justifi ed. Cases that involve a combination of these contexts are particularly 
likely to secure judicial deference to an independent Section 5. 
 First, courts are most likely to defer to administrative agency judgments in cases 
involving commercial practices about which the courts have not developed a deeply 
rooted body of precedent. In such cases, the courts may allow some administrative exper-
imentation and testing, even though they might not have reached the same result as the 
agency if they had analogized to conduct already covered by established liability norms. 
Conversely, courts are least likely to defer when they have already spoken to the exact 
practice on many occasions and developed a time-tested body of liability rules to govern 
it. Refusal by the agency to honor the judicially created precedents may look—to judges 
at least—like intransigence. 16 It is human nature (and judges are human aft er all) to be 
more open to an idea on which one has not yet expressed an opinion than to approve 
of an idea that contradicts one’s prior assertion. Hence, the FTC is most likely to be 
accorded a norm-creative role on issues that have not yet received a signifi cant airing in 
the courts, rather than in seeking to reform well-worn areas of precedent such as preda-
tory pricing or exclusive-dealing law. 
 Second, one area where many commentators have urged the Commission to assert 
Section 5 independence is where there is a gap between Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act. 17 Although Sections 1 and 2 plausibly could be read to cover all commercial conduct 
of an anticompetitive nature seamlessly, judicial construction of the statutory texts has 
created some coverage gaps. Section 1 requires a “contract, combination, or conspiracy”—
and hence agreement between at least two unrelated actors—which precludes coverage 
of purely unilateral acts, such as the unilateral adoption of practices that facilitate tacit 
price coordination or unsuccessful attempts to induce others to join a cartel. Section 2 
requires monopoly power, thus precluding application to anticompetitive acts involv-
ing a lesser degree of market power. Further, there is a serious juridical question about 
the viability under Section 2 of “joint monopolization” off enses where the defendants 
did not agree on a concerted pattern of conduct but adopted parallel measures, such as 
exclusive-dealing contracts, that eff ectively lock up the market to new entrants. 
 15  For a fuller discussion of the  Intel case, see,  Th oughts on Section 5 of the FTC Act ,  supra note 2. In the interests 
of full disclosure, I prepared the above paper while an academic consultant for Intel. 
 16  See FTC Workshop, Pitofsky Remarks,  supra note 5, at 65 (“Th e Federal Trade Commission really cannot 
overrule the Supreme Court. I don’t care what Section 5 says.”). 
 17  See id. 
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 During the 1970s, the FTC brought cases that sought to fi ll these statutory gaps with 
the seamless and open-ended text of Section 5. 18 Th ough it was rebuff ed by the courts, the 
Commission is surely on strong ground when asserting Section 5 as a catchall, intended 
by Congress to avoid end runs around the Sherman Act. Th e FTC Act’s legislative his-
tory evidences such as congressional intent. 19 Further, it is not hard to explain to courts 
why the act should be read broadly to capture conduct that, for statutory construction as 
opposed to public policy reasons, falls outside the purview of the Sherman Act. 
 Th ird, the Commission is on strongest grounds when challenging market power cre-
ated by fraud or deception. Th e FTC’s original mission, incorporated in the 1914 act 
creating the Commission, was to prohibit “unfair competition.” In the 1938 Wheeler-Lea 
Amendment, Congress added a prohibition on “unfair or deceptive” trade practices. 
Although these prohibitions are juridicially separate and not every “unfair method of 
competition” need involve “deception,” there are obvious statutory synergies between the 
amended statute’s competition and deception prongs. It follows that the Commission 
should enjoy the greatest independence from the constraints of Sherman Act law when 
advocating against market power acquired by deception or in antitrust cases that other-
wise involve misrepresentation or fraud. 20 As Justice Breyer explained in dissent in  FTC 
v. California Dental , the Commission should be aff orded an extra measure of discre-
tion when dealing with a restriction that was ostensibly justifi ed as a fraud-prevention 
measure. 21 
 Fourth, the Commission is likely to fi nd greater judicial receptivity to its norm cre-
ation in cases involving consumer decision making. Th e FTC brands itself as fi rst and 
foremost a consumer protection agency. 22 Th e Commission enjoys its greatest prestige 
in that capacity, as manifested by the extreme popularity and positive reputational ben-
efi ts for the Commission of the Do Not Call Registry. Indeed, the courts have aff orded 
the Commission deference almost exclusively in its consumer protection capacity. 23 It 
 18  See ,  e.g. , Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting FTC’s eff orts to challenge unilat-
erally adopted basing point pricing systems). 
 19  See Marc Winerman,  Th e Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition ,  71 
 Antitrust L.J.  1 , 74–75 (2003). 
 20  See ,  e.g. , FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 226 (1968) (observing that FTC determinations are entitled to 
“great weight” when the FTC has previously studied and examined a particular issue on multiple occasions). 
 21  Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 787 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(observing that the FTC is “an expert in the area of false and misleading advertising,” but found no basis for 
the association’s claim that a prohibition on price and quality advertising was necessary to protect consumers 
against misleading claims). 
 22  See ,  e.g. ,  Proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Implications for Consumers and the Federal Trade 
Commission ,  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and 
Consumer Protection 111 th Congress ( July 8, 2009) (Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission), 
 available at http://www.ft c.gov/os/2009/07/090708Acfpatestimony.pdf (noting that the “Commission 
also appreciates the proposal’s recognition of the FTC’s role as the nation’s consumer protection agency.”). 
 23  See Daniel A. Crane,  Technocracy and Antitrust ,  86  Tex. L. Rev.  1159 , 1206–207 (2009). 
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follows that the Commission is most likely to secure deference from the courts for an 
independent Section 5 construction when the Commission is acting directly for the ben-
efi t of consumers. 
 To secure maximum deference, the Commission should not only invoke a general 
consumer welfare justifi cation for its actions—all antitrust actions should be justifi ed 
on consumer grounds, whether or not consumers are directly involved in the market seg-
ment at issue. Rather, the Commission should pursue an independent Section 5 program 
primarily in cases that directly involve choices and decisions by consumers and where 
the Commission can explain how its expertise with consumer psychology, values, and 
practices justifi es a more liberal construction of Section 5 than might be justifi ed under 
the Sherman Act. 
 For example, a good bit of the Justice Department’s enforcement action against 
Microsoft  involved claims about consumer behavior. Operating system users allegedly 
were confused by the existence of multiple browsers on a desktop, which meant that if 
Microsoft  indelibly engraved Internet Explorer on the Windows desktop, OEMs would 
be reluctant to add Netscape Navigator for fear that their support lines would be over-
whelmed by confused and irate consumers. 24 Th us, even in a case involving primarily 
commercial practices between businesses (operating systems, browsers, programmers, 
OEMS, etc.), consumer mentality, habits, and vulnerabilities played a major role. In a 
case such as  Microsoft  , the Commission could stake a strong claim to Section 5 indepen-
dence by invoking its expertise about, and protection of, consumers. 
 Fift h, agency expertise may be most useful—and hence call for the greatest judicial 
deference—where it concerns predictions about future consequences of incipient behav-
ior. In such cases, courts may be comparatively ill equipped to divine the future and more 
likely to trust an agency’s prediction based on its superior familiarity with the type of 
conduct at issue. Conversely, courts are less likely to defer when the relevant conduct has 
been in place for some time and its actual eff ects can be tested using judicial empirics—
discovery and adversarial procedures. Judges are more confi dent in answering the ques-
tion “have prices gone up” or “has innovation been stifl ed” than “are prices likely to go 
up” or “is innovation likely to be stifl ed.” Th e more confi dent that judges are in their own 
abilities to work out the facts, the less likely they are to defer to administrative agencies. 
 In the classic formulation of an expansive Section 5 power, the Supreme Court held 
that the FTC Act “was designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Act . . . to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, 
would violate those Acts . . . as well as to condemn as ‘unfair methods of competition’ 
existing violations of them.” 25 As this quotation makes clear, the FTC’s prophylactic 
Section 5 powers—the power to reach beyond the Sherman Act—exist as to categories of 
 24  U.S. v. Microsoft  Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 61 (2001). 
 25  FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966) ( quoting FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 
392, 394–95 (1953)). 
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incipient behavior that could “when full blown” blossom into Sherman or Clayton Act 
violations. Conversely, as to practices that are not incipient but fully developed,  Brown 
Shoe suggests that the FTC Act is merely coextensive with the Sherman Act. 
 Finally, as with the Justice Department, the Commission needs to pay careful atten-
tion to the relationship between theory of liability and theory of remedy. One of the chief 
justifi cations for giving the FTC prophylactic powers beyond the reach of the Sherman 
Act is that Section 5 remedies are prospective and preventative rather than compensa-
tory, punitive, or structural. 26 Th e Commission should be accorded the greatest defer-
ence on liability norms when it simply orders the defendant to cease and desist from 
conduct that could impair the competitive functioning of a market in the future. When 
the Commission seeks extraordinary remedies—such as those that radically restructure 
an allegedly damaged market and seek to restore competition—the likelihood of judicial 
deference on liability norms is much smaller. 
 Th e Sherman Act’s criminal penalties and treble damages require a strict construction 
of the act, whereas the semi-regulatory nature of the FTC Act creates greater room for 
a broad enforcement mandate. As explained in the fi rst treatise on the FTC, written the 
year aft er the Commission’s formation (by the son of the fi rst Justice Harlan and the 
father of the second Justice Harlan):
 Th e word “unfair” is undeniably indefi nite in sense and meaning. What one person 
may consider “unfair” in competitive trade, another may perhaps regard as legiti-
mate. Conceivably, members of a court may disagree as to whether or not, under 
the circumstances of a particular case, a given method of competition is “unfair,” 
just as in one case they were unable to agree and adjudge whether or not certain 
regulations there involved constituted an “unreasonable” restraint of trade within 
the purview of the Sherman Law. Th at, however, is of no consequence, so far as 
concerns the validity of the Trade Law [the FTC Act]. Th e Trade Law does not pur-
pose to denounce any competitive act as a crime. It does not provide for the impo-
sition of a fi ne upon, or for the imprisonment of, any person guilty of practicing 
“unfair methods of competition.” Whatsoever the peril, under the Sherman Law, 
of practicing “unfair methods of competition,” a person resorting to such practices 
incurs no other risk, under the Trade Law, than that the Trade Commission, by pro-
ceeding as pointed out in the statute, may obtain the order of a court requiring him 
to cease and desist from such practice. 27 
 26  See ,  e.g. , FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 226 (1968) (observing that the FTC Act was intended to delegate 
power to “‘an administrative body of practical men’ who will be able to apply the rule enacted by Congress to 
particular business situations, so as to eradicate evils with the least risk of interfering with legitimate business 
operations”) (citation omitted). 
 27  John Maynard Harlan & Lewis Wilson McCandless, The Federal Trade Commission, Its 
Nature and Powers: An Interpretation of the Trade Law and Related Statutes 31 (1916). 
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 II. Section 5 in Innovative Industries
 a . incipiency and innovation 
 Th e foregoing discussion suggests that the FTC should be at the peak of its Section 5 inde-
pendence when it encounters uncharted waters and when it proposes forward-looking 
remedies designed to improve the functioning of a particular market in the future, as 
opposed to merely incentivizing fi rms to behave more competitively. Th is suggests, in 
turn, that Section 5 should play an important role in innovative industries, ones where 
new goods or services are coming to market and creating new economic realities for mar-
ket participants. Not surprisingly, some commentators see a special role for Section 5 in 
policing technological innovation. 28 
 Th e idea that Section 5 may be useful in policing innovation, although appealing, must 
have limits. First, it is important to observe a distinction between incipient  conduct and 
incipient  technologies . Innovation of importance to antitrust law can be of at least three 
kinds: developments in technology, developments in business practices, and develop-
ments in law It is the second kind of innovation that most clearly calls for the third. Even 
fi rms in static industries—meaning ones where the essential industrial technologies are 
not subject to a high rate of change—may be innovators in business practices, such as the 
forms of contracts they off er customers or suppliers, pricing practices, or human resource 
or intellectual property management. Th e FTC’s Section 5 powers should be at their 
zenith when fi rms deploy new business practices, not clearly addressed by existing anti-
trust law; the risks of anticompetitive eff ects are high; and reasonable alternative business 
strategies would likely secure comparable effi  ciencies. Th is does not mean, however, that 
the FTC should necessarily enjoy special latitude when the pace of technological devel-
opment in an industry is great. 
 Th ere is a case to be made for using Section 5 to remove restraints on innovation 
that might not be reachable under the Sherman Act because the technological condi-
tions they raise have not previously been considered. But that case should not amount 
to an undiff erentiated assumption that legal innovation by the FTC should be applied 
consistently to keep pace with technological innovation. To the contrary, legal innova-
tion will oft en be grossly outpaced by technological innovation. No amount of eff ort or 
determination to enhance the alacrity of legal innovation will do the trick, as even com-
missions (as contrasted with courts, which are notably ponderous) are constitutionally 
incapable of keeping up with many fast-moving industries. Nor would it be wise to rush 
the rate of legal innovation with the hopes of staying within sight of the technological 
innovation—like the turtle taking steroids to keep within striking distance of the hare. 
 28  See ,  e.g. , Richard Dagen,  Rambus, Innovation Effi  ciency, and Section 5 of the FTC Act ,  90  B.U. L. Rev.  1479 
(2010). 
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A legal innovation that lags a generation behind the technological state of the art will 
oft en do far more damage than good. 
 It should be clear that there is a time for declining to apply even traditional anti-
trust rules when the pace of innovation is so fast that application of the rule might 
interfere with technological progress. In the specifi c context of Section 5, the ques-
tion is whether the Commission should be entitled to go  beyond traditional antitrust 
principles—to impose liability beyond that which would obtain under the Sherman 
Act. Where the rate of innovation is high, and particularly where the innovation curve 
is steep, it should not. 
 Th e shape of the innovation curve is of particular importance in determining the call 
for novel theories of intervention. An industry may be innovative without being at a 
steep point in the innovation curve. For example, an industry may expend a large amount 
on research and development (R&D) and regularly develop new products or services, but 
do so in a fairly linear or constant way. Or, it may be still innovative and yet exhibiting a 
slower pace of innovation than in the past. On the other hand, there are industries when 
the innovation curve is steep, where there is not only a high degree of innovation but also 
an increasing rate of innovation. Th e steepness of the curve cannot last indefi nitely—
there are limits to the available progress in every technology. Moments during which the 
curve is steep are poor times for experimenting with legal norms. 
 In his widely discussed study of innovation,  Th e Singularity is Near , 29 Ray Kurzweil 
shows that technological paradigms typically go through a life cycle in three phases. First, 
there is an early phase of slow, exponential growth. In the middle-to-end of the life cycle 
there comes a phase of explosive exponential growth, where the technology changes rap-
idly—where the curve is nearly vertical. Finally, in the last phase, the curve levels off  as the 
paradigm matures and is eventually replaced by a diff erent paradigm. 
 Antitrust experimentation is only advisable during the fi rst or third phase. During the 
fi rst, the rate of change is slow enough that antitrust developments might hope to keep up. 
Th e same is true during the third, although any rules developed during that period may 
be more useful as beta tests for the coming paradigm than in redressing wrongs in tech-
nology that is coming near the end of its shelf life. During the middle period of explosive 
and accelerating innovation, the case for antitrust innovation is weak. When markets are 
highly dynamic competition is already doing its work. Th at legally mandated enhance-
ments in competition could make the market even more innovative must be weighed 
against the possibility that bad legal interventions—particularly those that would have 
made sense a generation or two earlier but rest on yesterday’s news—will slow the rate of 
innovation. Th e nod should generally go to the bird in the hand. 
 29  Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology 43–44 (2005).  
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 b. two examples: pharmaceuticals and computing 
 One of the diffi  culties in applying the principles suggested in the previous section is iden-
tifying where a market is in its technological curve at any given moment. Th e shape of a 
curve cannot be fully identifi ed until all of its data points are determined, which means 
that antitrust agencies can never be sure whether they are on the innovation curve. Th ere 
is also the problem of identifying the relevant unit. Should the degree of FTC indepen-
dence under Section 5 depend on the rate of innovation in a particular industry (i.e., 
pharmaceuticals) or in much more narrowly defi ned technology (i.e., second-generation 
ace inhibitors)? 
 Th e relevant unit for judging the innovation curve should depend not on formalistic 
market defi nition but on the scope of the rule the Commission is considering. If the 
Commission is considering a rule that would apply categorically to all patent settlements 
between pioneer drug makers and generics, then the relevant unit is the innovation curve 
of the pharmaceutical industry as a whole. Conversely, if the Commission is considering 
a rule tailored much more closely to a particular feature of a particular industry—such as 
bias in organic Internet search results—then the relevant unit for consideration should 
not be the Internet as a whole but organic search. Of course, it might be prudent to con-
sider the possibility of a narrower or broader rule given diff erences or similarities between 
the pace of innovation in diff erent market segments. However, once the Commission 
identifi es the relevant unit to which it proposes to exercise Section 5 powers, it is the rate 
of innovation in that unit that should count. 
 Another problem is how to judge the relevant rate of innovation. Simply counting 
trends in R&D expenditures or the incidence of patenting would be a poor proxy for 
judging where an industry is in its curve. R&D expenditures may be disproportionately 
spent during the fi rst and third phases of the innovation cycle, where fi rms are making 
foundational discoveries or preparing for paradigmatic change, even though the biggest 
leaps in innovation may occur in the middle and steepest part of the curve. Further, even 
if the incidence of patenting is highly correlated with innovation intensity—which is 
somewhat doubtful 30 —there may be a temporal disconnect between the patenting and 
innovation intensity. 
 Given diff erences between innovation drivers and manifestations of innovation among 
industries, it would probably be counterproductive to suggest broad rules to determine 
how quickly innovation is occurring. Illustrations from two industries—pharmaceuticals 
and information technology—demonstrate how innovation curve analysis, and implica-
tions for Section 5, might play out. 
 First, the pharmaceutical industry  may be an example of an industry in which the rate 
of innovation is, at least for the moment, decelerating. To repeat an earlier point, this 
assumes that the entire industry is the relevant regulated unit as opposed to particular 
 30  See ,  e.g. , Jonathan M. Barnett,  Is Intellectual Property Trivial? ,  157  U. Pa. L. Rev.  1691 , 1703 (2009).  
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therapies, where the rate of innovation may still be high. But, pharma, as a whole, may 
be receding from a golden era of rapid-fi re introduction of new pioneer drugs into an era 
where innovation proceeds at a more sedulous pace. According to the NIH, the pace of 
new drug introductions has been slowing for the last 15 years. 31 Th e NIH believes that 
pharmaceutical companies are failing to pursue promising leads for drugs for maladies 
such as depression and Parkinson’s disease. 32 Th e ratio of branded to generic prescrip-
tions also tells a story. In 2004, 57 percent of all prescriptions were generic. In 2009, the 
number was 75 percent, and IMS Health projects that it will rise to 80 percent in 2012. 33 
Although this may sound promising from a static effi  ciency perspective, one more omi-
nous reason is that blockbuster drugs are going off  patent and are not being replaced by 
new ones. In 2011, the Obama administration announced that it had become so con-
cerned about the lethargic pace of new drug introductions that the administration is 
starting a new billion-dollar drug development center in the NIH. 34 
 Observe that, to say that the rate of innovation in pharmaceuticals may be slowing is 
not to say that the pharmaceutical industry is no longer innovative. Th e question is how 
quickly new generations of drugs are superseding old ones in relation to how quickly that 
occurred in the past and might occur again in the future following a paradigmatic shift . 
If, in fact, we are presently in a period of fl attening on the innovation curve, then the case 
for Section 5 innovation may be stronger. Th is does not, of course, mean that more anti-
trust enforcement or new antitrust theories will prompt innovation in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. It is possible that an excess of generic free riding or other competitive forces 
have eroded the pioneer fi rms’ incentives to invest adequately in risky R&D portfolios. 
Th e point is merely that, if the rate of innovation in pharmaceuticals is no longer accel-
erating, the deployment of innovation Section 5 theories may be more justifi ed than at a 
period of a steeper innovation curve. 
 Computing and information technology is a very diff erent matter. Under the familiar 
Moore’s law, formulated in 1965, the number of transistors on integrated circuits dou-
bles approximately every two years. 35 Even as computer processing speed and dynamic 
random access memory have accelerated dramatically in the last few decades, prices for 
processors and memory have fallen dramatically. 36 Kurzweil projects that the innovation 
 31  Gardiner Harris,  Federal Research Center Will Help Develop Medicines ,  N.Y. Times , Jan. 22, 2011. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Kathlyn Stone,  74 Percent and Growing: Most Prescriptions Now Written for Generic Drugs (May 25, 2011), 
 availalble at http://pharma.about.com/b/2011/05/25/74-percent-and-growing-most-prescriptions-now-wri
tten-for-generic-drugs.htm. 
 34  Gardiner Harris,  Citing Slow Pace of New Drugs, US to Open $1b Development Center ,  N.Y. Times , Jan. 23, 
2011,  available at http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/health/articles/2011/01/23/citing_slow_pace_of_new_ 
drugs_us_to_open_1b_development_center/. 
 35  Gordon E. Moore,  Cramming More Components into Integrated Circuit ,  available at http://download.intel.
com/museum/Moores_Law/Articles-Press_Releases/Gordon_Moore_1965_Article.pdf., [last visited March 
18, 2013]. 
 36  Kurzweil ,  supra note 29, at 56–72. 
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curve for integrated circuit computing will continue to grow exponentially until around 
2020, at which time it will reach the level off  and be replaced in a paradigm shift  to 
three-dimensional molecular computing. 37 Overall, the innovation curve for computer 
power and cost continues to steepen. 38 
 Similar acceleration in the innovation curve is occurring in other areas of informa-
tion technology. Internet search appears to be transitioning from its fi rst phase of slower 
exponential growth into an intermediate phase of explosive growth. Search engines are 
redefi ning the very understanding of organic search, shift ing it from a library catalogue of 
links to possibly relevant sites to an integrated information portal dynamically responsive 
to users’ needs and demands. 39 Transformative shift s in Internet search functionality and 
capability seem to be occurring in smaller and smaller increments of time, suggesting that 
the curve is steepening. 
 Again, the fact that computing and information technology may be in a particularly 
steep part of its innovation curve does not mean that such industries should receive a free 
pass from antitrust law. As to commercial practices that are well understood and clearly 
anticompetitive, there should be no hesitancy to apply the Sherman Act. On the other 
hand, it would be inadvisable to develop new norms under Section 5 to govern industrial 
segments that are in a state of rapid and accelerating innovation. Any such norms would 
likely be outdated before promulgated. 
 III. Conclusion 
 In the coming decade, the FTC will make critical choices about how it presents its case 
for Section 5 independence. Th e case it makes is not only critical for the future of the 
Commission, but for the future of public enforcement more broadly. As innovation in 
legal norms is oft en driven by innovation in human technologies, the conversations about 
FTC innovation and technological innovation are certain to be intertwined. It would be 
prudent for the Commission to have a clear vision not only about the justifi cations for 
and boundaries of Section 5 as a general matter, but its special roles and limitations in 
innovative industries. 
 37  Id. at 67. 
 38  Id. at 68–70. 
 39  See Daniel A. Crane,  Search Neutrality as an Antitrust Principle ,  19  Geo. Mason L. Rev .  1199 (2012). 
 
